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Abstract
This essay is based on a presentation made on January 24, 2020 at the invitation of the Texas
Journal of International Law and the Strauss Center for National Security at the University
of Texas. That presentation focused on the two questions mentioned in the title of this essay
– Do Blockchain Technologies Make Us Safer? And Do Cryptocurrencies Necessarily Make
Us Less Safe? The essay presents answers to the two questions: “yes” and “probably yes.”
This essay begins with some level-setting on different types of blockchain technologies and
of cryptocurrencies, and gives some background materials on global and national responses
to certain cryptocurrencies, such as El Petro sponsored by Venezuela’s PDVSA and
Facebook’s Libra.
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INTRODUCTION
Escalations in the tensions around the world and recent cyberwarfare incidents against
agencies, businesses, and infrastructure in the United States bring new attention to the
adoption of blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies. Additionally, plans announced by
Facebook, the Russian Federation, and China to issue new cryptocurrencies add new urgency
to discussion of issues related to the increasingly wider adoptions of cryptocurrencies,
including government-issued digital currencies (“central bank digital currencies” or
“CBDCs”). Questions about “El Petro”, the cryptocurrency sponsored by the Maduro
government in Venezuela and backed by the reserves of the state-owned oil company, raise
additional issues. National and regional governments, such as the United States and the
European Union, and inter-governmental organizations, such as the Financial Action Task
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Force (FATF), have aimed initiatives at the uses of cryptocurrencies to limit their use for
laundering monies or financing terrorism.
This essay will offer thoughts on topics intersecting national security and these two
emerging technologies – blockchain and cryptocurrencies. Foremost among these topics are:
(1) Are blockchain technologies able to make us safer? and,
(2) Do some or all cryptocurrencies necessarily make us less safe?
Generally speaking, the answer to both questions is “yes.” However, the reasons for
each differ significantly. The first question is far easier to answer than the second.
This essay will address both the two basic questions and the two pairs of subsidiary
questions. This essay also attempts to tie issues surrounding blockchain and cryptocurrencies
to international law and national security by discussing two laws that pose challenges to
international law and to national security law. To address these questions, this essay first
engages in some level-setting for blockchain and cryptocurrencies. The conclusion will set
out subjects for additional research and offer final thoughts on the introductory questions.

I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND
CRYPTOCURRENCY
The terms “blockchain” and “cryptocurrency” have been around long enough that some
of us think we know something about each term. For the purposes of this essay, I want to
make clear how I am using these terms, and I invite readers’ comments in response. Readers
familiar with this subject matter may wish to move on the sections dealing with the two broad
questions posed above.
A. Blockchain
In this article, I use the term “blockchain” to refer to permissionless, decentralized
public distributed ledgers—engaging all four of these concepts as prerequisites to the
observations I want to make. First, the term “permissionless” describes blockchains like the
blockchain that is the authoritative ledger for Bitcoin.
In simplified terms, a blockchain is a method of storing records of ownership or of assets
and transactions which uses a version of a distributed ledger.1 A distributed ledger keeps
records “in many different locations simultaneously.”2 Distributed ledgers theoretically are
auditable, verifiable, and transparent.3
No one needs “permission” to have an interest or transfer of interest recorded on the
Bitcoin blockchain. A user needs instead to create bitcoins through a problem-solving
process known as “mining,” which results in the new bitcoin being reflected on the block.
Others who earn bitcoins by performing transfer verification services for the Bitcoin
blockchain or who purchase or acquire bitcoins from others do not require anyone’s advance
permission to participate.4 None of us would need permission from anyone except a miner or
1.
ARTEMIS CARO, BLOCKCHAIN: THE BEGINNERS GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND
BITCOIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY 12 (2018).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Arnold Daniels, Permissionless Private Blockchains, LTO NETWORK (Sep. 26, 2019),
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a counterparty in another transaction to acquire a bitcoin; none of us would need permission
to mine a bitcoin—we’d just need the mental, computational, and, in the case of proof-ofwork generation, an energy supply fit for the job. Alternatively, one could acquire the funds
to buy a bitcoin from a previously recognized owner.
Second, the Bitcoin blockchain is decentralized, which means that no one person,
government (yet), or other legal entity is in charge.5 Rather, as noted above, a group of miners
acting as the verification and registry team are in charge.
Third, the term “public” is distinct from “private” or fully anonymous in this context
because of the chain of transfers that are viewable in a “public” blockchain.6 Bitcoin is a
public system: it operates through addresses and nodes. In the basic Bitcoin regime, individual
transfers can be associated with prior transactions by tracking backwards through the pseudoanonymous addresses that the chain reveals.7 The blocks are open-to-view even if no “names”
in the traditional sense are associated with the property registered on the block.
The chain of blocks that track the sequence of transactions for cryptocurrencies provide
a unique opportunity for public analysis of transaction patterns and deterrence of doublespending.8 Although the nominal identity of each person is not recorded as a human name or
by a common identification value like a Social Security number, the public key used to sign
the transaction can provide much of the same value.9 All of the transactions associated with
the key of a particular person are easy to find on the blockchain in the publicly accessible
information.10 Even if the transactions are routed through different exchanges or
intermediaries, all of the cryptocoins that flow through the wallet can be flagged.11
The ability to review and essentially trace transfers back to the time of the creation of a
bitcoin facilitates identification not just of transfers, but of the actors involved.12 To
demonstrate how open-to-view Bitcoin transactions are, in 2018 the Treasury’s Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) placed two Iranian intermediaries and their identified
blockchain addresses on OFAC’s “Specially Designated Nationals” list.13 The selected actors
had been identified by name as being associated with laundering proceeds from the Sam-Sam
ransomware attacks.14
“Distributed ledger” refers, in the first instance, to the manner that proposed
entries/transactions are verified before being entered on the Bitcoin blockchain.15 The
https://blog.ltonetwork.com/permissionless-private-blockchains-lto-network/ (last updated Dec. 23, 2019).
5.
White Paper, Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 4 (2008)
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [hereinafter Bitcoin White Paper].
6.
PETER WAYNER, DIGITAL CASH: COMMERCE ON THE NET 2 (2d ed. 1997).
7.
Sarah Meiklejohn et al., A Fistful of Bitcoins: Characterizing Payments Among Men with No Names,
USENIX 128 (Dec. 2013), https://www.usenix.org/publications/login
/december-2013-volume-38-number-6/fistful-bitcoins-characterizing-payments-among.
8.
See Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 1, 3; Liang J. Li L., Zeng D (2018) Evolutionary dynamics of
cryptocurrency transaction networks: An empirical study, 1, and text accompanying note 5, PLoS One 13(8):
e0202202, https:doi/org/10.1371/juornal.pone.0202202.
9.
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Jeff John Roberts, To Catch a Bitcoin Thief, Call These Detectives, FORTUNE (June 27, 2018),
https://fortune.com/2018/06/27/bitcoin-detective-zcash-cryptocurrency/.
13. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Iran-Based Financial Facilitators of
Malicious Cyber Activity and for the First Time Identifies Associated Digital Currency Addresses (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm556.
14. Id.
15. U.K. GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 17–18 (2016),
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authority to verify and authorize entries is distributed among the group of nodes designated
for this purpose. These ledgers are decentralized by design. Their decentralization is
considered to provide the trust proxy that legacy providers of record systems have long
provided.16 Carla Reyes explains that distributed ledger technologies
[use] the [distributed ledger technology or DLT] to refer generally to “computer
software that is distributed, runs on peer-to-peer networks, and offers a
transparent, verifiable, tamper-resistant transaction-management system
maintained through a consensus mechanism rather than by a trusted third-party
intermediary that guarantees execution.”17
Finally, a “ledger” is just a system of records—a source of information or a place to
store records.18 People have used ledgers since Biblical times.19 The bitcoin blockchain as
with other distributed ledgers is the location of records that hold a series of increasingly long
entries that show the chain of transactions involving a single unit (a bitcoin) and a storage
system that is designed to be irreversible.20 The first entry in the ever-longer “addresses” on
the blockchain stays with the later transactions.21 The second entry does as well.22 This
allows observers to see how the bitcoin has moved through later transactions to the present
day. The retention of earlier transactions identifiers is comparable to the requirements of the
“Travel Rule” that the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed on wire transfers in the
1990’s.23
Blockchains perform storage and vault-like protections for many commercial
applications. They can replace legacy paper or digital records systems created and maintained
by Federal or State agencies relating to who owns which parcels of land, who owns which
motor vehicles or watercraft, who is the record owner of intellectual property, or who is the
holder of bank or credit-card accounts.24 Such systems could be public and distributed as the
Bitcoin blockchain is, or could be operated by a centralized manager and lose its distributed
character.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972
/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf.
16. Simon Gray, Blockchain Creates Open Finance System to Compete With Legacy Providers, TOOLBOX
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://finance.toolbox.com/article/blockchain-creates-open-finance-system-to-compete-withlegacy-providers.
17. Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373, 379-380 (2019); see also Carla
L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Crypto Law, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 390-91 (2017) (“Distributed ledger technology
(DLT) refers to computer software that is distributed, runs of peer-to-peer networks, and offers a transparent,
verifiable, tamper-resistant transaction-management system maintained through a consensus mechanism”).
18. Ledger, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ledger (last visited Mar. 10,
2020).
19. JP Fabri, LEDGER-NOMICS, BITEMYCOIN, https://bitemycoin.com/opinion/ledger-nomics/ (last visited
Mar. 8, 2020) (“The first recorded ledgers were found in the city of Mesopotamia, today’s Iraq, around 7000 years
ago.”).
20. See Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 1 (explaining a new electronic payment system to work based on
“cryptographic proof . . . without the need for a trusted third party”).
21. See generally id. at 3.
22. Id.
23. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Cross-Border Electronic Transmittals of Funds, 75 Fed. Reg.
60377, 60396 (2010) (including definitions originally codified at 31 C.F.R. § 103.14). See Funds Transfer Rule, 31
C.F.R. § 1010.100 (2018) (defining all terms for the statute).
24. Greg Kaza, The Blockchain Revolution, 41 REG. 53, 54 (2018).
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Ledgers like that undergirding Bitcoin also can help us follow supply chains and guard
against counterfeit or “grey market” goods entering the marketplace in place of authorized,
compliant, and wholesome goods.25
Blockchain-recorded transactions have the added advantage of being non-reversible.26
Blockchain transactions are one-way streets: no one can place a “stop-payment order” against
a payment they initiated via a system using the bitcoin blockchain.27 The only way to get a
refund or reversal of a transfer is to get the transferee to send a new message to the blockchain
in favor of the transferor with the same value.28 The blockchain then shows both sides of the
transaction—the in-bound and out-bound transactions.29
B. Cryptocurrency
The term “cryptocurrency” currently describes a class of digital assets that is not
designated as legal tender by any national government.30 One reason for this framing is that
when a national government designates a currency as legal tender and the currency comes
into another government’s jurisdiction or is designated by counter parties to a transaction as
the pertinent currency for satisfying obligations under contracts, the US government refers to
that currency transaction as “foreign exchange.”31 The US government applies different
standards to “foreign exchange” for purposes of taxation and regulation of intermediaries
handling it.32 Currency that is regulated as “foreign exchange” is not “legal tender” under the
Coinage Act of 1965.33
Its early proponents viewed cryptocurrencies as market-based alternatives to the
hegemony of financial services providers.34 Other proponents see it as a faster and less costly
means of transferring ownership of assets that may either be digital or may be real-world
assets.35 Yet others see cryptocurrencies as displacing the need for banks or other legacy
25. Grey Market, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/greymarket, (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
26. Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 1.
27. See generally U.C.C. § 4-403 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2019).
28. Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 2.
29. Id.
30. Contra 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (1983) (“United States coins and currency (including Federal reserve notes and
circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes
and dues[.]”) I do not include cryptocurrencies such as El Petro offered by Venezuela’s state-controlled oil and
natural gas company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., because it appears to be more in the nature of a security than of
a currency.
31. U.S. Foreign Exchange Intervention, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (May, 2007),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed44.html.
32. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(1) (2019) (defining a “dealer in foreign exchange” as “a person that accepts
the currency, or other monetary instruments, funds, or other instruments denominated in the currency, of one or
more countries in exchange for the currency, or other monetary instruments, funds, or other instruments
denominated in the currency, of one or more other countries in an amount greater than $1,000 for any other person
on any day in one or more transactions, whether or not for same-day delivery.”); see also I.R.C. §988 (2018)
(defining “foreign currency” for purpose of taxing income from sources without the United States).
33. Contra 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2018) (stipulating that “United States coins and currency (including Federal
reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks)” may legally pay debts, charges,
taxes, and dues but that “foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tenders for debts.”). Coinage Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89–81, § 79 Stat. 254, 255.
34. Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 1.
35. See Dennis Ng & Paul Griffin, The Wider Impact of a National Cryptocurrency, GLOBAL POL. 1, 20
(2018), https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Ng%20and%20Griffin%20%20The%20Wider
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providers of asset-storage or asset-transfer systems, including systems supporting remittances
and other cross-border transfers.36 And some early inventors viewed cryptocurrencies as a
means of reducing or eliminating the risk of “double spending” in digital environments.37 The
range of potential uses includes faster and less costly cross-border payments and trade
transactions, as well remittance payments.38
International organizations and various governments have developed definitions of
cryptocurrencies or “virtual currencies” to explain how they fit into their regulatory regimes.
One of the earliest definitions is the G-20’s Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) 2014
definition:
Virtual currency is a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and
functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a
store of value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a
creditor, is a valid and legal offer of payment) in any jurisdiction. It is not issued
or guaranteed by any jurisdiction, and fulfills the above functions only by
agreement within the community of users of the virtual currency. Virtual currency
is distinguished from fiat currency (i.e. “real currency,” “real money,” or “national
currency”), which is the coin and paper money of a country that is designated as
its legal tender; circulates; and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of
exchange in the issuing country. It is distinct from e-money, which is a digital
representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer value denominated
in fiat currency. E-money is a digital transfer mechanism for fiat currency—i.e.,
it electronically transfers value that has legal tender status.39
In the United States, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) had
issued its first guidance on cryptocurrencies in March 2013:
“[V]irtual currency” is a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some
environments, but does not have all the attributes of real currency. In particular,
virtual currency does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction. . . .
“convertible” virtual currency . . . either has an equivalent value in real currency,
or acts as a substitute for real currency.40

%20Impact%20of%20a%20National%20Cryptocurrency.pdf (arguing that corporations may benefit by using
cryptocurrency when transferring large amount of funds) (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
36. See Emilio R. Coello, Are Cryptocurrencies Useful for Remittances?, COIN CTR. (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://coincenter.org/entry/are-cryptocurrencies-useful-for-remittances (explaining significantly lower costs to
senders recipients and shorter delivery times of as little as 90 seconds compared with three to five days).
37. See David Chaum, Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments, in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY EUROCRYPT ‘98, (Kaisa Nyberg, ed., 1998), (explaining how blind signatures allow for untraceable payment
systems and prevent against counterfeiting).
38. See Christina Comben, How Ripple’s xRapid Could Improve Global Payments, COIN RIVET (Feb. 14,
2019), https://coinrivet.com/how-ripples-xrapid-could-improve-global-payments/ (explaining how Ripple’s
xRapid, a cryptocurrency, can improve remittances, cross-border transactions, and trade).
39. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES – KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT RISKS
4 (2014), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potentialaml-cft-risks.pdf [hereinafter FATF Definitions].
40. FIN. CRIMES ENF. NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001 APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S
REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, 1 (Mar. 18, 2013),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [hereinafter FinCEN March 2013 Guidance].
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FinCEN’s March 2013 Guidance focused on persons that engage as a business in
transactions involving exchange of cryptocurrency for real currency, funds, or other crypto
currencies, or that issue and have authority to redeem or withdraw from circulation
cryptocurrencies.41 This focus was appropriate because FinCEN was explicating how “virtual
currencies” fit into its 2011 Guidance on responsibilities of “money transmitter[s]” and
“provider[s] of prepaid access” under Treasury Department rulings.42 FinCEN updated the
March 2013 Guidance and its intervening opinions on specific topics in May 2019 without
changing the fundamentals of its 2013 Guidance.43
For the moment, cryptocurrencies can be separated into the eight groupings discussed
below. These categories each contain unique features that pose national security risks. Some
present very low risks, and others present higher risks, as I explain in Part IV of this article.
1. Permissionless, decentralized and market-based.
Since its introduction in 2009, Bitcoin has spurred the rise of cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin
operates on a decentralized basis with verification and blockchain maintenance entrusted to
a peer-to-peer network nodes.44 Bitcoin, as previously mentioned, is also permissionless and
pseudo-anonymous.45
On the downside, however, bitcoins are backed only by the blockchain and a market’s
willingness to trust it.46 No hard assets or digital assets (other than the blockchain itself) stand
behind bitcoins.47
In a public, permissionless blockchain, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, all participants are
theoretically equal.48 There is no central management or authority that can be compelled to
report users’ data or keep records prescribed by a government other than those inherent to
their business model, or even a central authority to respond to legal process.49 The exception
to this “equality” principle is that some participants play key roles in validating transactions
on the blockchain, including “miners” of bitcoins who perform verification and validation
functions but are not known to all participants.50 However, their verification-and-validation
roles do not necessarily make them persons susceptible to regulatory requirements or to
subpoenas or other forms of legal process by governments or counterparties.
Transactions on public blockchains are all open-to-view and relatable to each other in a
chain because the “public key” is in fact public. The “private key” that is required to engage

41. Id at 1–2.
42. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(4)–(5) (2019); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.420 (2019); Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—
Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Prepaid Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45403, 45419 (July 29, 2011).
43. FIN. CRIMES ENF. NET., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2019-G001 APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S
REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (May 9, 2019)
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2019-05/FinCEN%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf
[hereinafter FinCEN Regulation Application].
44. Bitcoin White Paper, supra note 5, at 3, 8.
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 1.
47. John P. Kelleher, Why Do Bitcoins Have Value?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100314/why-do-bitcoins-have-value.asp (last updated Apr. 8, 2020).
48. See Arnold Daniels, The Rise of Private Permissionless Blockchains — Part 1 (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://medium.com/ltoneetwork/the-rise-of-private-blockchains-part-1-4c39bea2e2be (discussing the difference in
accessibility between a public permissionless network and a private permissionless network).
49. FinCEN Regulation Application, supra note 43, at 18.
50. Adam Chodorow, Bitcoin and the Definition of Foreign Currency, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 367, 373–74.
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in transfers of these cryptocurrencies is private – not visible on the blockchain.51 Transactions
are time-stamped and sequential.52 One can follow a chain of transfers from the first entry to
the latest entry in time, and can ascribe to the last entry the status of being the “owner” or at
least the custodian of the related crypto assets for the owner.53 It also is possible to follow
transfers from the original public key address to others in the chain by comparing the relative
lengths of the chains with similar initial addresses to the current “owner” or custodian.54
2. Permissioned, centralized and linked to fiat currencies.
Another form of cryptocurrencies is known as “stablecoins.”55 To reduce volatility in
pricing, stablecoins should be backed by assets having values equal to the number of coins in
circulation.56 These cryptocurrencies are centralized because some entity issues the units of
currency against its reserves of the fiat currency or currencies to which the stablecoins are
linked.57 Tether is an example of a stablecoin, despite the allegations over the past 18 months
that the existing reserves do not support the number of Tether stablecoins in circulation.58
A centralized manager has information about the intermediaries or owners of the coins
because stablecoin holders theoretically have redemption rights to the underlying reserve fiat
currency or other asset.59 One might also describe stablecoins as having values dependent on
whatever “reserves” support the “stable” claim of stablecoin issuers. Facebook’s Libra
appears to be in the stablecoin category, but it has other attributes that I describe in
subparagraph 6 of this Part, below.
3. Public, Centrally Validated Blockchains
EOS60 and Ripple61 are examples of public, permissioned blockchains. Some
participants in this category of blockchains/cryptocurrencies are more equal than others,62

51. J. ANTHONY MALONE, BITCOIN AND OTHER VIRTUAL CURRENCIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY lxxiv (2014).
52. Eric D. Chason, How Bitcoin Function as Property Law, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 129, 167–71.
53. WAYNER, supra note 6, 16–17.
54. Id.
55. Connor Blenkinsop, Stablecoins, Explained, COINTELEGRAPH,
https://cointelegraph.com/explained/stablecoins-explained (last updated Apr. 30, 2019).
56. Id. (“[I]f there are 500,000 USD-pegged coins in circulation, there should be at least $500,000 sitting in a
bank.”).
57. Id.
58. Daniel Palmer & Nikhilesh De, New York Attorney General Calls Bitfinex’s Legal Stance ‘Deeply
Perverse’ in New Filing, Story from Policy & regulation, COINDESK, (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.coindesk.com/new-york-attorney-general-calls-bitfinexs-legal-stance-deeply-perverse-in-new-filing
(“[Tether] . . . acknowledged in court that [it] was backed only by ‘cash and cash equivalents . . . representing
approximately 74 percent of the current outstanding tethers.’” This suggested that Tether stablecoins were not fully
backed).
59. See 31 C.F.R. § 1022.420 (2019) (stating the recordkeeping requirements for providers of prepaid access
to enable reconstruction of activation and later prepaid-related transactions).
60. EOS.IO, https://eos.io/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) (EOS Worldwide, LLC and its Block.One
operate blockchain protocols that can be private or public in their operations as businesses building on those
systems select).
61. RIPPLE LABS, INC., https://ripple.com/company/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) (stating Ripple’s native
cryptocurrency is known as XRP).
62. See Angela Walch, Univ. Coll. London Ctr. for Blockchain Techs., Intermediaries Who Must not be
Named? The Keepers of the Public Blockchain, (Nov. 21, 2019) (unpublished draft paper presented at the Smart
Regulation and the Future of Financial Services Public Policy Conference hosted by Antonin Scalia Law School
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because the network appoints certain participants to hold privileges over others.63 These
privileges include participating in running the node and keeping certain records, which are
not powers shared by the general participants.64
These privileges draw criticism for EOS, in part because the privileged, as of the time
this article was published, were concentrated in China.65 The centralization of validation in
privilege holders on these networks may be sufficient to impose record-keeping and reporting
of specific types of records of customers and transactions to government authorities or
counter-parties in discovery or to respond to legal process.66 However, this may be difficult
to achieve with offshore privileged participants.67
A public, permissioned blockchain is one source of future public records systems, such
as those for recording ownership of tangible property or providing public notice of securityinterest claims.
4. Private, Permissionless Blockchains
A private, permissionless blockchain has nodes that “will only acknowledge [other
nodes’ existence], but not share any data” with them.68
One attraction of the private, permissionless blockchains is that each “smart contract”
that may be used “automatically creates a private (side-) chain associated with that contact.”69
In addition, although a node may hold more than one “side-chain,” one node will not hold all
of those in existence for the larger chain.70
Each node still operates as a repository.71 Only designated persons or organizations get
permission to read specific nodes; designated persons will require cryptographic signatures
to gain access to reading.72 To have reading privileges, one needs both the unique identifier
(address) and the URL of the node that has a copy of the smart contract and associated chain.73
Also, each node will hold only data needed to service its own users—an “agent-centric”
solution.74 These chains inside private chains make the task of ferreting out specific
transactions more complicated because they are not visible to the those with a need to know.75

and George Mason University) (on file with Professor Walch at awalch@stmarytx.edu) (delineating between
varieties of blockchain system participants).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Flipside Crypto, Cryptocurrency in Focus: EOS Has Deep Pockets, but Faces Challenges Ahead,
THESTREET (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/cryptocurrency/cryptocurrency-in-focus-eos-isloaded-with-ipo-cash-but-has-tough-job-ahead-15093676 [hereinafter Cryptocurrency in Focus] (reporting that 21
delegates validate transactions, making EOS more centralized and that these delegates are concentrated in China).
66. See generally TIMOTHY G. MASSAD, IT’S TIME TO STRENGTHEN THE REGULATION OF CRYPTO-ASSETS
49–55 (2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Economis-Studies-Timothy-Massad-CryptocurrencyPaper.pdf.
67. Id. at 47 (“In connection with closing the regulatory gap in this country, we would be wise to give the
SEC and CFTC the ability to address the risks that offshore platforms pose to U.S. investors.”).
68. Daniels, supra note 48.
69. Id.
70. See id. (“a single node holds multiple of ad-hoc chains, but never all of them”).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Daniels, supra note 48.
75. Id.
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In this respect, the ‘permissionless’ concept seems a stretch, but the main point is that access
to information is not public in any form.
These blockchains represent more powerful opportunities to hide assets because “smart
contracts on these private networks, not only define who is allowed to perform contract
actions but also who is allowed to read the contract and all related data.”76 First, the “smart
contract” manages any contract actions required and created by this node, making it an ideal
“location” from which to move those assets in the intermediate “layering” steps needed for
traditional money laundering.77 Owners of crypto assets on private, permissionless
blockchains are not likely to spend them outside a narrow sphere of prospective
counterparties.78 This narrow sphere of prospective counterparties and the restrictions on
permissions help protect the identities of users of these blockchains.
Experimentation with private, permissionless blockchains has been limited.79 As of
October 2018, one commentator, Arnold Daniels, had identified only three chains – the
Holochain, LTO Network, and Monet. Holochain allows “users [to] share information peerto-peer on a need-to-know basis.”80 The LTO Network is Daniels’ own project: it “run[s]
trustless workflows, targeting multinationals and governments . . . . The process has a strong
focus on privacy and GDPR compliance.”81
The last, as of February 2019, is Monet. Monet may be the most likely to be used to
hide proceeds of financial crimes: it allows users to build “ad-hoc, short-lived chains, with
mobile devices acting as nodes for the participants.”82
Other crypto assets are in existence and development that will enhance privacy
protections for users. One later entrant in this category is the LTO Network.83 Indeed, LTO
Network states as a goal both keeping governments away and promoting compliance84 with
the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).85
5. Services and Applications that Allow “Mixing” of Bitcoins to Preserve More
Privacy for Users
“Mixing” or blending of transactions allows a Bitcoin user to transfer or transact with
bitcoins and to have the details of the transaction deleted as soon as the transaction is
complete.86 So that transactions are not linked to the in-bound bitcoins or prior transactions
on that bitcoin chain, one or more units of Bitcoin enter the validation process to be “mixed”
or “laund[ered]” with other bitcoins, and different bitcoins emerge.87 This process works like

76. Id.
77. See id. (explaining how one can use a “smart contract” to disguise criminal activity).
78. See generally id. (noting the narrow scope of users on a single permissionless private network).
79. Id.
80. Daniels, supra note 48.
81. Id. For more information on the GDPR, see Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection
Regulation), OJ L 119, 04.05.2016 [hereinafter EU Regulation 2016/679]. The GDPR went into effect on May 25,
2018.
82. Daniels, supra note 48.
83. See generally id.
84. See generally id.
85. EU Regulation 2016/679, supra note 81.
86. Nine Best Bitcoin Mixers 2020, THEDARKWEBLINKS, https://www.thedarkweblinks.com/best-bitcoinmixer-services/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) [hereinafter Best Bitcoin Mixers 2020].
87. Id.
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the stages of laundering “money.” First, the assets are “placed” into a deposit account,
securities account, or hard assets with a legitimate entity.88 Then, in a process to separate the
proceeds from the underlying crime called “layering,” the assets are moved around from one
or more locations or through one or more person to others.89 Finally, the assets eventually
emerge with the appearance of being clean—free from association with their origins.90 Fees
charged for this bitcoin-mixer-laundry-style service vary considerably by service provider
and the number of bitcoins being washed through the provider’s system.91
6. The Libra: Facebook’s Cryptocurrency
Facebook announced in June 2019 that it was preparing to launch a global currency built
on a self-designed blockchain.92 The announcement described “a new decentralized
blockchain, a low-volatility cryptocurrency, and a smart contract platform that together aim
to create an new opportunity for responsible financial services innovation.93 Although
professedly “decentralized,” Libra will be “governed by the Independent Libra Association
tasked with evolving the ecosystem.”94 Libra has stablecoin features: it will be backed by a
“basket of [assets]” designed to give each unit “intrinsic value.”95 The Libra Association has
the purpose of “coordinat[ing] and provid[ing] a framework for governance for the network
and reserve” with membership “formed from the network of validator nodes that operate the
Libra Blockchain.”96 A separate entity, the Libra Reserve, is intended to hold and manage the
assets underlying Libra towards low-volatility.97
7. Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs)
Conversation about digital currencies issued by central banks has increased over the
past year, particularly in France and Germany98 following the publication of Facebook’s plans
for its Libra Cryptocurrency.99 The most recent development is a call for a Bank for
International Settlements’ study of CBDCs.100

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING RISK ASSESSMENT, 2 n.1 (2015),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/National%20Money%20Laundering
%20Risk%20Assessment%20%E2%80%93%2006-12-2015.pdf [hereinafter “NMLRA 2015”].
91. Nine Best Bitcoin Mixers 2020, supra note 86.
92. Mike Issac and Nathaniel Popper, Facebook Plans Global Financial System Based on Cryptocurrency,
NY TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/technology/facebook-cryptocurrency-libra.html.
93. An Introduction to Libra: White Paper, LIBRA, https://libra.org/en-US/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2019
/06/LibraWhitePaper_en_US.pdf (last updated Jan. 21, 2020) [hereinafter Libra White Paper].
94. Id. at 3.
95. Id. at 3; see Jon Fingas, Facebook’s Libra Currency Will Get Half Its Backing from the US dollar,
ENGADGET (Sept. 22, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019/09/22/facebook-libra-currency-backing/ (reporting
that Facebook updated the basket of currencies it intended to include in the Libra Reserve).
96. Libra White Paper, supra note 93, at 3–4.
97. Christian Catalini et al., LIBRA, The Libra Reserve, https://libra.org/en-US/about-currencyreserve/#the_reserve (describing intentions to fully back each coin “with a set of stable and liquid assets . . . users
can have confidence that they will be able to sell any Libra coin at or close to the value of the reserve at any
time.”).
98. Bjarke Smith-Meyer, France and Germany Pledge to Fight Facebook’s Libra, POLITICO (Sept. 13,
2019), https://www.politico.eu/article/france-and-germany-pledge-to-fight-facebooks-libra/ (maintaining that their
governments “would combat any effort by [Facebook] to “claim monetary power”).
99. See generally Libra White Paper, supra note 93.
100. Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Central bank group to assess potential cases for central bank
digital currencies (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.bis.org/press/p200121.htm.
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Central bank digital currencies would not be “virtual currencies” under the definitions
adopted by FATF in 2014101 or FinCEN in 2013102 because they would
(a) qualify as “legal tender” in the jurisdictions whose central banks issue them; and
(b) would be digital representations of fiat or real currency.103
The term “central bank digital currency” in this taxonomy excludes the last category in
this section of this paper—government-sponsored cryptocurrencies such as Venezuela’s
Petro because, at least initially, such cryptocurrencies are not designated as “legal tender” by
sponsoring governments.104
8. Government-sponsored cryptocurrencies or other digital assets designed for
disruptive effect
This category of government-sponsored cryptocurrencies appears to be designed—at
least initially—for limited types of transactions, such as purchases of oil or oil futures or for
use only or primarily by off-shore persons.105 Because their announced raison d’etre is to
evade sanctions or frustrate operations of normal reserve currencies, we may think of this
category as being disruptors of a different dimension than Bitcoin.
i. El Petro
The most visible example of this disruptor category is “ El Petro,” the cryptocurrency
issued by Venezuela’s state-run oil-and natural-gas company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.
(PDVSA).106 This cryptocurrency emerged in early 2018.107
One of the stated purposes of El Petro is to enable the Maduro government to sell oil
and evade economic sanctions placed on the Maduro government, PDVSA, and
representatives of both by the United States.108 In March 2018, the Trump Administration
imposed economic sanctions that barred US Citizens from purchasing Petros.109 Maduro
government officials and officials of the PDVSA were named in that and subsequent rounds
of economic sanctions.110
101.
102.
103.
104.

FATF Definitions, supra note 39, at 4.
FinCEN March 2013 Guidance, supra note 40, at 1.
Id.
Petro: Within 120 Days the Token Will Become Legal Tender for All Government Transactions,
NEWSBTC (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/04/12/petro-within-120-days-the-digital-token-willbecome-legal-tender-for-all-transactions-involving-government-institutions/.
105. Thomas Meyer, Petro: Stable Coin for Crypto Economy or Illegal Oil Futures?, COINTELEGRAPH (Feb.
22, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/petro-stable-coin-for-crypto-economy-or-illegal-oil-futures.
106. Sam Meredith, Venezuela’s Oil-Backed Cryptocurrency More Likely to be Ruled ‘Illegitimate’ than
Succeed, Economist Says, CNBC (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/20/venezuelas-new-bitcoin-oilbacked-cryprocurrency-launched-in-bid-to-save-economy.html.
107. Samuel Haig, Venezuelan Petro Against US Sanctions: History and Use of the Crypto, COINTELEGRAPH
(July 17, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/venezuelan-petro-against-us-sanctions-history-and-use-of-thecrypto.
108. Id. (providing a timeline of developments, including imposition of sanctions by President Trump, in El
Petro from its announcement to July 2019).
109. Id. (citing backing for El Petro as including diamond and gold reserves as well as oil and gas).
110. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13827, 83 C.F.R. 12469 (2018) [hereinafter Executive Order 13827-Venezuela],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-taking-additional-steps-address-situationvenezuela/.

55 Tex. Int’l L. J. 386

386

TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 55:3

There is evidence that US sanctions have been working,111 a fact that portends more
efforts to evade sanctions and may cause more allies to help the Maduro government and
certain individuals against whom the President has imposed sanctions.
Recently, the Maduro government has been encouraging broader internal uses of Petros,
which has led to a surge in domestic person-to-person (“P2P”) uses and which has almost
equaled the cryptocurrency penetration in the Russian Federation.112 More recently, the
Maduro government is pushing for its people to use Petros to make everyday purchases.113
P2P volumes in Venezuela are rising and, allegedly, are right behind Russia in cryptocurrency
penetration.114
To the extent that the Maduro government allows or encourages use of El Petro in
domestic transactions, the government appears to be attempting to “regularize” El Petro as
fiat currency or as CBDCs.115 That could lead to greater acceptance of Petros both in
Venezuela’s domestic economy and as a medium for payments of oil and natural-gas
purchases on a larger scale.
ii. Russia and China and Plans for Gold-Backed Crypto
Russia and China also have announced plans to issue gold-backed cryptocurrencies for
their own internal or external trade reasons.116 Another goal appears to be replacing the US
Dollar as the world’s reserve currency.117 Russia has used cryptocurrencies such as the
Venezuelan, government-owned Petro,118 which is specifically identified on the US Treasury
Department’s “Specially Designated Nationals” (SDN) list,119 to help Venezuela evade US
economic sanctions,120 and to assist Russia’s operations in Crimea.121

111. See Rafeal Bernal, Trump Administration Imposes Venezuela Sanctions on Russian Company, THE HILL
(Feb. 18, 2020), https://thehill.com/latino/483444-trump-administration-imposes-venezuela-sanctions-on-russianoil-company (discussing the impact of the US sanctions on Venezuela).
112. Haig, supra note 107 (mentioning Maduro’s order in July 2019 to Venezuelan banks to accept Petros in
their banking; useful timeline of the emergence).
113. Id.; William Luther, Why is Maduro Still Pushing the Petro?, Am. Inst. Econ. Res. (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.aier.org/article/why-is-maduro-pushing-the-petro (describing push by Maduro government for
ordinary transactions because of “cash shortages”).
114. Haig, supra note 107.
115. Stephen O’Neal, Central Bank-Issued Digital Currencies: Why Governments May (or May Not) Need
Them, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 25, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/central-bank-issued-digital-currencieswhy-governments-may-or-may-not-need-them.
116. Daniel Palmer, Russian Central Bank to Consider Gold-Backed Cryptocurrency, COINDESK (May 23,
2019), https://www.coindesk.com/russian-central-bank-to-consider-gold-backed-cryptocurrency; Sean AdlTabatabai, Russia and China Roll Out 100% Gold-Backed Currency, NEWSPUNCH (Mar. 25, 2018),
https://newspunch.com/russia-china-gold-backed-currency/.
117. Adl-Tabatabai, supra note 116.
118. See Sujha Sundararanajan, Venezuelan President Announces ‘Petro’ Oil-Backed Cryptocurrency,
COINDESK (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/venezuelan-president-announces-petro-oil-backedcryptocurrency (describing the implementation of a cryptocurrency by the Venezuelan government).
119. Executive Order 13827-Venezuela, supra note 111. See also Nikhilesh De, Trump Orders New
Sanctions Against Venezuela’s Crypto, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/trump-orders-new-sanctionsagainst-venezuelas-national-cryptocurrency (last updated Mar. 20, 2018) (elaborating on the Trump
administration’s sanctions against Venezuela for Petro cryptocurrency).
120. Simon Shuster, Exclusive: Russia Secretly Helped Venezuela Launch a Cryptocurrency to Evade US
Sanctions, TIME (Mar. 20, 2018), https://time.com/5206835/exclusive-russia-petro-venezuela-cryptocurrency/.
121. Helen Partz, Adviser to President of Russia Proposes Digital Currency in Crimea, COINTELEGRAPH
(Apr. 22, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/adviser-to-president-of-russia-proposes-digital-currency-in-crimea
(quoting Sergey Glazyev, who opined that the cryptocurrency was to reduce “cross-border barriers” and attract
foreign investors who “are afraid of sanctions”).
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The Putin government has spoken publicly of its intentions to create “official
cryptocurrencies.”122 Russia’s announced purpose is to thwart economic sanctions imposed
on Russian organizations and citizens.123 This puts the forthcoming Russian gold-reservesbacked cryptocurrency both in the disruptor category in this paper’s taxonomy and in the
reserves-backed category of cryptocurrencies.
It is unclear whether governments such as Russia that sponsor cryptocurrencies will use
their sovereign rights to deem their sponsored cryptocurrencies as “legal tender,” meaning a
legal means to pay taxes and debts.124 It certainly appears that the Maduro government is
moving in that direction with El Petro. Some of these specialty cryptocurrencies, such as
China’s current, external-only version of the yuan or renminbi, referred to as the CYH, are
destined to operate only as an external currency, not for domestic purposes.125 It is unclear
whether owners of these cryptocurrencies will be allowed to exchange it for rubles, yuan, or
pesos, that is, for “real” domestically usable legal tender. What is clear, in the United States
at least, is that when a foreign government declares a cryptocurrency “legal tender” for its
own internal-domestic-market purposes, that currency will cease to be “virtual currency” as
FinCEN has defined it126 and will become “foreign exchange.”127 Does this matter in the shortterm to the potential national security threats that these government-sponsored but not
CBDCs may pose? I deal with that question in Part IV of this article.

II. CAN BLOCKCHAIN MAKE US SAFER?
Turning now to the first of two questions for consideration: Can blockchain technologies
make us safer? I have already stated that the answer is “yes.” The more important questions
are how and why blockchains may make us safer. This paper focuses on health care and life
science applications as well as on supply-chain applications in food and pharmaceuticals. I
previously mentioned but did not elaborate on this topic in my January 24, 2020 presentation
on which this essay is based.

122. See Rachel McIntosh, Oil-Backed Cryptocurrency Could Hit Russian Markets Soon,
FINANCEMAGNATES (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.financemagnates.com/cryptocurrency/news/oil-backedcryptocurrency-could-hit-russian-markets-soon/ (detailing Russian government officials’ approval and plans for an
oil-backed cryptocurrency).
123. See Helen Partz, Russia’s Central Bank to Consider Gold-Backed Cryptocurrencies for Mutual
Settlements, COINTELEGRAPH (May 23, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/russias-central-bank-to-considergold-backed-cryptocurrencies-for-mutual-settlements (citing Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Russia Central Bank,
giving testimony before the Duma).
124. The Case of Mixed Money in Ireland, Trin. 2 James I. A.D. 1605, reprinted in 2 COBBETT’S COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 114–130 (1809) (the earliest reported decision upholding the sovereign’s authority
to make, change or debase its money and designate its choice as legal tender for payments of taxes and debts)
[hereinafter The Case of Mixed Money]. For a recent discussion of U.S. methods thwarting competition to the
dollar, see Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Substitutes for Legal Tender: Lessons from History for
the Regulation of Virtual Currencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW (John A.
Rothchild, ed., 2016).
125. Jeremy Cook, Why Does China Have Two Currencies?, WORLDFIRST (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.worldfirst.com/uk/blog/international-business/foreign-exchange-international-business/china-twocurrencies/.
126. FinCEN March 2013 Guidance, supra note 40.
127. Id.
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A. Blockchain technologies are designed to be tamper-resistant.
Although many experts talk about blockchains being “immutable,”128 it is preferable to
think of blockchains as being “tamper-resistant.”129 To be more precise, “blockchain”
technologies – distributed ledger technology (DLT)– offer a larger set of technologies that
are engineered to have certain properties.130 Professor Carla Reyes offered one of clearest
and simplest descriptions of DLTs:
[T]he term distributed ledger technology (DLT) . . . refer[s] generally to
“computer software that is distributed, runs on peer-to-peer networks, and offers
a transparent, verifiable, tamper-resistant transaction-management system
maintained through a consensus mechanism rather than by a trusted third-party
intermediary that guarantees execution.”131
Building on this definition, there are a few key attributes associated with DLTs that can
make us safer, including:
•

transparency in transactions,

•

verifiable transactions,

•

consensus mechanism as a governance principle,

•

peer-to-peer networks, and

•

no third-party intermediary to introduce cyber-threats or to be the focus of
hacking attempts, or fewer opportunities for effective cyber-hacks of the
blockchain.

Among the fields in which blockchain technologies are expected to produce gains in
safety are healthcare and life sciences. The major areas of predicted utility, some of which
will need to be private, permissioned blockchains, include:
•

Electronic health records systems, 132

•

Enabling sharing aggregate patient data with privacy protections for patientlevel data that can serve larger population studies instead of patient-level
data,133

•

Limitation of single-point of failure episodes,134

128.

E.g., Dr. Garrick Hileman & Michel Rauchs, Global Blockchain Benchmarking Study, CAMBRIDGE CTR.
17 (2017), https://cdn.crowdfundinsider.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/2017-GlobalBlockchain-Benchmarking-Study_Hileman.pdf (debunking common “blockchain myths”—one of which is
immutability or tamper-proof status, noting that network participants actually can reverse transactions under
specific circumstances).
129. Carla L. Reyes, Cryptolaw for Distributed Ledger Technologies: A Jurisprudential Framework, 58
JURIMETRICS J. 283, 285 (2018).
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGY: A
COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2016)).
132. See generally Tim Mackey, et al., ‘Fit-For-Purpose?’ Challenges and Opportunities for Applications of
Blockchain Technology in the Future of Healthcare, BMC MED. (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-019-1296-7 (containing particularly enlightening
tables and charts of use cases).
133. Id.
134. Id.
FOR ALTERNATIVE FIN.
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•

Increases in compliance with regulatory requirements or internal risk-control
protocols,135

•

Lowering certain costs through automation, removing intermediaries, or
reducing administrative burdens,136

•

Fraud prevention,137

•

Credentialing and licensing of medical professionals,138 and

•

Clinical trial management.139

Since my January 24, 2020 presentation, we can expand the utility of the second item on the
list above: this utility may offer benefits in tracking the spread of infectious diseases, such
as the Covid-19 virus, and of contagious diseases. Blockchains may assist us in performing
studies on the effectiveness of therapies and of engaging in contract tracing.
B. Blockchain technologies can contribute to safer supply chains, including chains
that show origins of foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals.
Because of their general tamper-proof status and of the ability to design private and
permissioned blockchain applications, as described in Part II of this essay, blockchains can
help protect supply chains in food and pharmaceuticals. With respect to food, blockchains
can help us determine the origins of specific batches of food stuffs—namely, whether batches
were produced domestically or not.140 With the added reliability of blockchain technologies,
this information can help public-health officials trace back to specific deliveries if a
contaminant is detected. For example, this technology could have assisted in discovering
Listeriosis in pre-sliced meats and cheeses in 2019 and E. coli bacteria in the notorious 1993
Jack-in-the-Box hamburger episode.141
Sourcing and origins of pharmaceuticals are not second-in-fact in the benefits that may
flow to the public from blockchain record-keeping. The presence of counterfeit components
and useless pharmaceuticals in the pharmaceutical supply chains are sources of significant
concerns. Examples of these problems include drugs with no active ingredients, those with
the wrong or counterfeit ingredients, and those with the wrong dose of correct active
ingredients.142

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Mackey et al., supra note 132.
139. Id. at 6–9.
140. Jenny Splitter, What Can Blockchain Really Do For The Food Industry, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennysplitter/2018/09/30/what-can-blockchain-really-do-for-the-foodindustry/#4998b4cc488e.
141. See U.S. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROLS & PREVENTIONS, Outbreak of Listeria Infections Linked to DeliSliced Meats and Cheese, (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/deliproducts-04-19/index.html
(reporting that Listeria outbreak was linked to food supplies); Jack-in-the-Box E. Coli Outbreak Lawsuits –
Western States (1993), MARLER CLARKE (Apr. 1, 2008), https://marlerclark.com/news_events/jack-in-the-box-ecoli-outbreak-western-states (reporting that hamburger patties served in 73 Jack-in-the-Box restaurants caused E.
coli infections across several states).
142. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Counterfeit Medicine (Sept. 13, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/buying-using-medicine-safely/counterfeit-medicine (explaining what counterfeit
medicine is).
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III. WILL CRYPTOCURRENCIES MAKE US LESS SAFE? IF SO, WHY?
First, let me state that I do not believe that all cryptocurrencies make us safer. Second,
I do not believe that all cryptocurrencies make all of us less safe. So, it is important to describe
“safer” and “less safe” in this context and to explain what factors, features, or arrangements
may make persons in the United States less safe than they otherwise might be and what I
mean by “safer” or “less safe.” It also is important to appreciate that these are complicated
questions because privacy is an important protection for activists and journalists, especially
in non-rule-of-law jurisdictions. Cryptocurrency transfers can provide privacy protections.
Finally, it is important to identify the spheres in which cryptocurrencies pose risks to safety
that are different from legacy, intermediated payments, and payments services.
In highlighting three types of risks in this section, I do not mean to belittle the
contributions that well-governed cryptocurrencies and real blockchains can make to
economies, trade, and global remittances—the contributions are real. They include potential
expansion of financial inclusion, faster delivery of trade payments and remittances, and less
costly delivery of payments domestically and internationally.
The three topics I mention in this section may not be in the order in which the specific
issues will emerge. The purpose is to begin to identify types of risks that may emerge. In my
concluding remarks, I mention other topics where my own research may apply, and as a
means of encouraging others to look at the same issues.
A. Risks to “monetary sovereignty”
During the March 1, 2019 Roundtable on the Future of Financial Regulation hosted by
George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School, I raised my concern that statesponsored cryptocurrencies could threaten national security because—taken to their logical
endpoints—cryptocurrencies challenge the ability of governments to prescribe “legal tender”
and, for that reason, to protect national governments’ “monetary sovereignty.”143 I made that
comment before Facebook announced its intention to launch its Libra cryptocurrency.144
The connection to concerns about “monetary sovereignty” appear to be animating the
objections of governments, such as those in France and Germany—whose finance ministers
declared in September 2019 that “[n]o private entity can claim monetary power, which is
inherent to the sovereignty of nations.”145 This sentiment is in accord with the outcome of The
Case of Mixed Money in Ireland, the 1605 decision upholding the authority of the English
sovereign, Queen Elizabeth I to fix the currency and its value within that sovereign’s
domain.146 (Despite more than 400 years old, the opinion in Mixed Money explains so much
about governments’ insistence on controlling “legal tender.”)
To see one of the logical outgrowths of state-sponsored cryptocurrencies such as El
Petro, we can look to the consultation request filed by the Maduro government in Venezuela
against the United States in the World Trade Organization in late 2018.147 Maduro’s
143. Sarah Jane Hughes, Remarks at the Roundtable on the Future of Financial Regulation at the Antonin
Scalia Law School (Mar. 1, 2019).
144. See Julia Boorstein, Facebook Launches a New Cryptocurrency Called Libra, CNBC (June 18, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/17/facebook-announces-libra-digital-currency-calibra-digital-wallet.html
(announcing Libra after my talk in March).
145. Smith-Meyer, supra note 98, at 1.
146. The Case of Mixed Money, supra note 124.
147. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, WTO, (1994) [hereinafter GATT].
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complaint cited violations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994 (GATT)148
and General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) obligations occasioned by Executive
Order 13,827 and other actions taken by the United States against El Petro.149 More
specifically, the Maduro Government charged that the United States was violating GATS
Article II Section 1. That Article provides that no member will treat another member less
favorably than any other nation.150 Exceptions to WTO obligations arise if the member
maintains that their actions relate to “essential security interests.”151 Executive Order 13827
explicitly references a prior declaration of a national emergency by the United States against
Venezuela—Executive Order 13692 of March 8, 2015152 and Executive Order 13808 of
August 24, 2017.153 As of July 1, 2020, there had been no progress to the appointment of the
panel to hear Venezuela’s complaint.154 President Trump’s Executive Orders against El Petro
and its government-operated company sponsor, PDVSA, prohibited “U.S. persons” from
transactions “related to, provi[ding] financing for, and other dealings in” digital currency,
coins or tokens “issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela on or after
January 9, 2018 . . . .”155 The President’s sanctions order reached “any digital currency, digital
coin, or digital token, that was issued by, for, or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela
on or after January 9, 2018 . . . .”156 The President’s anti-Petro Executive Order cited the
President’s authority to deny access to U.S. markets if the purpose—such as evading
economic sanctions—is “unlawful.” 157
Other examples showing that cryptocurrencies are designed to enable governments to
evade sanctions come from Iran and Russia.158 Beyond that, we see evidence that governments
aid each other in avoiding sanctions.159 Others believe that cryptocurrencies generally may
diminish the effectiveness of sanctions.160 A decrease in national governments’ monetary
policy or control capacities because of an increase in assets placed in cryptocurrencies could
decrease the dollar or other reserve currencies that central banks use to respond to crises of

148. Id.
149. Request for Consultations by Venezuela, United States−Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and
Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS574/1 (Aug. 1, 2019); See also Tom Miles, Venezuela Launches WTO challenge to
U.S. Sanctions, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-venezuela-sanctionswto/venezuela-launches-wto-challenge-to-u-s-sanctions-idUSKCN1P21L6 (discussing Venezuela’s complaint
further).
150. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS].
151. GATT art. XXI. For discussion of how the WTO signatories expected Article XXI to be interpreted, see
GATT, ‘Analytical Index, Note by the Executive Secretary’ (MGT/61/52, June 1952).
152. Exec. Order No. 13,692, 3 C.F.R. 12692 (2015-2016).
153. Exec. Order No. 13,808, 3 Fed. Reg. 41155 (2017).
154. United States−Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, World Trade Organization, WTO
DS574 (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds574_e.htm (reporting that
Venezuela’s request for a panel hearing is pending).
155. Exec. Order No. 13827-Venezuela, supra note 110.
156. Id.
157. Id. at preamble.
158. See Manshee Joshi, Iran Proposes Use of Cryptocurrency to Elude Sanctions, CRYPTOPOLITAN (Feb. 27,
2020), https://www.cryptopolitan.com/irans-use-of-cryptocurrency/ (reviewing numerous efforts to bring “mining”
and investments to Iran, and the use of resulting cryptocurrencies to evade U.S. sanctions).
159. See Shuster, supra note 121 (outlining Russia’s encouragement of Venezuela avoidance of US
sanctions).
160. Keith Johnson & Elias Groll, U.S. Sanctions Weapon Is Under Threat - but Not from Bitcoin, FOREIGN
POL. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/24/u-s-sanctions-weapon-under-threat-but-not-frombitcoin-blockchain-dlt-petro/.
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national, regional, or international dimensions.161 The Bank for International Settlements has
commented on monetary sovereignty risks from cryptocurrencies.162
“Monetary policy” capacity enables governments to control inflation and spur economic
growth.163 Use of monetary policy tools such as those that the Federal Reserve System
deployed during the 2008–2009 financial crisis both in favor of U.S.-based depository
institutions and global institutions enabled its program of “qualitative easing” of the economy
through its discount-window lending and other measures.164
B. Concerns about cryptocurrencies’ roles in money laundering and
terrorist financing
Concerns about the uses of cryptocurrencies as tools in money laundering and terrorist
financing caused the G20 to urge member states to adopt regulations compelling
cryptocurrency exchanges to collect customer information.165 The Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Treasury noted that Libra could be “misused by money launderers and terrorist
financers.”166
C. Deposit volatility – enabling runs and panics in crypto and traditional depository
institutions ─ and enabling fraud and theft
Cryptocurrencies, given the speed at which transfers can be settled compared with
legacy bank transfers, also enhance risks associated with rapid movements of values from
nation to nation and could contribute to broader instability in world markets and national
economies. Use of crypto assets to either avoid national securities regulatory regimes or to
engage in market manipulation is also worrisome.167 The February 2020 G20 attendees also
called for measures to handle consumer and investor protection, following the more than
$4.26 billion in cryptocurrency holdings lost to fraud and theft in the first half of 2019.168

161. Id.
162. Bank for Int’l Settlements, COMM’N ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES, G7 Working Group on
Stablecoins, Investigating the Impact of Global Stablecoins, CPMI Papers No. 187, iii (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d187.pdf.
163. See Monetary Policy Principles and Practice, FED. RESERVE BOARD (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/monetary-policy-what-are-its-goals-how-does-it-work.htm (“In the
broadest terms, monetary policy works by spurring or restraining growth of overall demand for goods and
services in the economy.”).
164. Id.
165. Gregory Lisa & Hogan Lovells, G20 Calls on Countries to Adopt FATF Crypto Standards, JD SUPRA
(Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/g20-calls-on-countries-to-adopt-fatf-41765/ (referencing the
June 2019 FATF Guidelines on cryptocurrencies and the “travel rule” adopted then to require “virtual asset service
providers” to collect such information). See also Smith-Meyer, supra note 98, at 2 (describing July 2019 concerns
about these topics by G7 finance ministers).
166. White House Press Briefing by Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin on Regulatory Issues Associated
with Cryptocurrency, US DEPT. OF TREASURY (July 15, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/sm731.
167. See generally, Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, Jr., The SEC & The Internet: Regulating
the Web of Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262 (2014).
168. Tom Zanki, G20 Wants Countries To Implement Strict Crypto Rules, LAW360 (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1246727/g20-wants-countries-to-implement-strict-crypto-rules.
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CONCLUSION
In this essay, I asked and began to answer two questions. The first focused on whether
blockchains could provide safer environments for supply chains and beyond. In response, I
argue that blockchains generally can increase our collective safety in certain ways. I focus
on supply-chains for food and pharmaceuticals and the manner that blockchain, can protect
the integrity of information about contents, providers, and purchasers, I note that supply
chains can be retraced if problems arise. Additionally, I note that the primary issue with
blockchains in this respect is that, if the information sent to the block is garbage, then the
information available later will be no better than garbage. This is a challenge that blockchain
technology tries to address. However, despite considerable optimism that it can, we do not
yet know how successfully it meets this challenge.
The tamper-resistant features of permissionless blockchains provide greater protections
from hacking and theft generally and security in the integrity of data from interference by bad
actors. Data integrity and data resilience are key aspects of secure supply chains for
foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, and other important manufactured goods and commodities. They
also matter enormously in safe-and-sound financial services and to national security.
With the second question I asked, will cryptocurrencies make us less safe? Despite
longstanding interests in faster and less costly forms of payment products, I see some of the
developments in cryptocurrencies as making individuals less safe for the reasons I have laid
out in Part IV of this essay. That does not mean that we cannot avoid increased or increasing
risks if we act soon and also if we act in concert with other national governments and
international organizations such as the G-7, G-20, and the European Union. One of the means
of containing some of the risks that cryptocurrencies may pose to individuals and institutions
is to do as the United States, the European Union, and the G-20’s Financial Action Task Force
are endeavoring to do, which is to place responsibilities on gatekeepers or the entities that
FATF calls “virtual asset service providers” (VASPs).169 How or why do some of the
cryptocurrencies cause or contribute to national security risks as I have described them above?
In addition to the three, top-level concerns that I discuss in Part IV, I have identified the
following as issues which demand the attention of scholars:
• Will pseudo-anonymous cryptocurrency transactions cause governments and supplychain financers a loss of information about trade balances and possibly about trade
occurrences?
• Will pseudo-anonymous cryptocurrency transactions cause business and consumers to
lose demand deposit features common in commercial banking or assured redemption rights
to values transferred in exchange for cryptocurrencies?
• Will cryptocurrency transactions weakening governments’ ability to track transactions
for tax purposes? Will this weaken governments generally – even as much as individuals
might like it?
• How will businesses and governments manage the loss of government-provided
deposit insurance if a cryptocurrency provider fails? Can we fund a new program that ensures
speedy resumption of access to deposits when non-insured financial services providers or
VASPs fail? How will we manage the potential for disruption to the economy as businesses
and consumers lack access to enough fiat currency or fiat-associated deposits to meet their
169. Jack Gavigan, The FATF Recommendations, ELECTRIC COIN CO. (Sept. 19, 2019),
https://electriccoin.co/blog/the-fatf-recommendations/.
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daily needs including payroll? Lengthy delays are not fictional. Mt. Gox and Quadriga FX
customers are waiting for access to their assets today.
• What types of anti-fraud and anti-market manipulation tools will we need to manage
different types of service providers than those currently regulated in the U.S. and elsewhere?
These questions are the topics that need future exploration as cryptocurrencies and other
blockchain technologies come into wider adoption.

